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This study examines the association between 10-K filing length and M&A returns. We posit that 
10-K filing length influences shareholder information acquisition and processing costs. Longer 10-
K filings reduce information acquisition costs by making more information about the target 
available to the shareholder, but may increase information processing costs by increasing the 
difficulty of extracting that information. Which effect dominates ultimately determines the 
association between 10-K filing length and M&A returns. We find that 10-K filing length is 
positively related to M&A returns, suggesting that the reduction in information acquisition costs 
dominates the increase in information processing costs. This relation is stronger when the acquirer 
has limited access to private information about the target, and when 10-K filings contain text 
denoting risk. The relation is weaker when 10-K filings contain complex text and financial 
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Mergers and acquisitions are among the most significant decisions for firms. Before announcing 
an acquisition, the bidding firm must acquire the information necessary to estimate the target firm’s 
intrinsic value, growth opportunities, synergies, and reservation price, as well as establish the deal 
terms. While high-quality and comparable accounting information is important to facilitate target 
firm valuation (Raman, Shivakumar, and Tamayo 2013; Francis, Huang, and Khurana 2015; Chen 
et al. 2018), accounting figures alone may not provide a full picture.  
This study examines the association between target firm 10-K filing length and M&A returns, 
which are market returns around the M&A announcement date. These returns capture shareholder 
perceptions of the deal. We posit that lengthier 10-K filings reduce information acquisition costs 
for shareholders by making more information about the target available. More information allows 
shareholders to more accurately value the target and assess the potential benefits of the 
transaction.1 If this is the case, we should observe a positive association between 10-K filing length 
and M&A returns.2 We call this the information acquisition cost effect.  
However, lengthy 10-K filings also increase shareholder processing costs. Longer 10-K filings are 
often regarded as more complex and thus less readable (Loughran and McDonald 2014; Li 2008). 
Prior literature has found that more complex financial statements are associated with higher analyst 
dispersion and more market underreactions (You and Zhang 2009). These findings suggest that 
shareholders face greater difficulty extracting meaningful information about a target firm from 
                                                          
1  On the one hand, if management fails to submit a 10-K filing, this will provide no information to market participants. 
On the other hand, if management provides an overly lengthy filing, this could lead to information overload 
(Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003; Miller 2010; KPMG 2011). However, that risk in an M&A context, where market 
participants seek as much information as possible, is likely to be minimal. 
2  We implicitly assume that management incentives of both the target and acquirer firms are aligned with the 
incentives of their shareholders. 
2 
 
longer filings. If this is the case, we should observe a negative association between 10-K filing 
length and M&A returns. We call this the information processing cost effect. In this study, we aim 
to empirically determine which of the two effects dominates. 
To test our predictions, we use a sample of 605 U.S. mergers and acquisitions of publicly listed 
firms for the 1997-2013 period. To proxy for 10-K filing length, we use the number of words in 
the target 10-K filing. To measure M&A returns, we use the acquirer cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) and the weighted average cumulative return of the acquirer and target firms. Both measures 
of market returns are intended to capture shareholder perceptions of the success of the M&A 
transaction.  
Our findings indicate that, on average, the information acquisition cost effect dominates the 
information processing cost effect. Specifically, in line with a net reduction in information 
acquisition costs, we find that lengthier 10-K filings are associated with larger acquirer CARs, and 
with larger weighted average cumulative returns of the acquirer and target. This positive 
association suggests that shareholders perceive the M&A deal positively when a target firm 
submits lengthy 10-K filings. 
We also undertake a series of cross-sectional tests to identify which factors influence the relation 
between 10-K filing length and M&A returns. First, we test whether the relation is stronger when 
shareholders perceive that the acquirer has limited access to private information about the target. 
We capture the level of access by the length of time between the signing of the confidentiality 
agreement and the M&A announcement date, as well as by the form of the M&A transaction. We 
find a stronger association between 10-K filing length and M&A returns when the length of time 
is short, and when the M&A transaction is in the form of an auction.  
3 
 
Second, we examine whether the quality of information in 10-K filings affects the relation between 
the quantity of information in the 10-K filing, as captured by 10-K filing length, and M&A returns. 
We test for two dimensions of quality: textual complexity, and financial statement accounting 
quality. We posit that these dimensions weaken the relationship between 10-K filing length and 
M&A returns. Textual complexity increases shareholder information processing costs, thus 
reducing the net benefit arising from the reduction in information acquisition costs. Financial 
statements that exhibit higher accounting quality reduce the usefulness of the explanations found 
in lengthier 10-K filings, thus weakening the association between 10-K filing length and M&A 
returns. In line with our predictions, we find that the association between filing length and M&A 
returns is weaker when the filing contains complex text and when the financial statements are of 
high accounting quality. 
Finally, we test whether the overall tone of the 10-K filing impacts M&A returns. Specifically, we 
posit that the relation between 10-K filing length and M&A returns is stronger in the presence of 
text denoting greater target firm risk. This is because such filings are more likely to contain a 
comprehensive explanation of these risks. We use the relative number of words in the 10-K filing 
that denote uncertainty, as well as weak necessity modals, to proxy for a tone that suggests greater 
risk. In line with our expectations, we find that the relation between 10-K filing length and M&A 
returns is incrementally positive in the presence of words that denote greater risk. 
We subject our findings to a series of robustness tests. First, we test whether our results are robust 
to different measures of 10-K filing length. Second, we test whether our measure of 10-K filing 
length captures public information about the target beyond what is contained in the target 10-K 
filings. Finally, we test whether our results are robust to the inclusion of additional controls, 
capturing (1) cases where the acquirer and target firm share a common auditor, (2) target firm 
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voluntary disclosures, (3) target firm risk, and (4) target firm complexity. The results suggest that 
the observed relationship between 10-K filing length and M&A returns is not sensitive to the way 
10-K filing length is measured, or to the inclusion of any of the above controls in our analyses. 
This study contributes to the literature examining the effects of accounting information on mergers 
and acquisitions (e.g. Rossi and Volpin 2004; Koch, Lefanowicz, and Robinson 2012; Raman, 
Shivakumar, and Tamayo 2013; Marquardt and Zur 2015; McNichols and Stubben 2015; Francis, 
Huang, and Khurana 2015; Ahmed and Elshandidy 2016; Chen et al. 2018). The literature analyzes 
various characteristics of accounting information, but does not explore how the quantity of 
financial information influences M&A outcomes. We contribute to this line of research by showing 
that the length of 10-K filings is associated with larger M&A returns.  
We also complement the literature on the factors that drive firms’ voluntary disclosures. 
Specifically, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) suggest that CFOs use voluntary reporting 
strategically, in order to enhance their reputation for transparent reporting, address the limitations 
of mandatory reporting, and reduce the information risk priced into a firm’s stock. In line with 
this, we find that increased voluntary reporting, as captured by the length of the 10-K filing, is 
viewed positively by shareholders. 
Finally, we contribute to the literature examining the consequences of textual complexity (Li 2008; 
You and Zhang 2009; Lehavy, Li, and Merkley 2011; and Loughran and McDonald 2014). We 
show that the complexity of 10-K narratives has important economic consequences, and that it 
influences the relation between 10-K filing length and M&A returns.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the relevant extant 
literature, and, in section 3, we develop our hypotheses. Section 4 describes our research design, 
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while section 5 outlines the data used in the study. Our main findings are presented in section 6, 
and our robustness tests are in section 7. Section 8 concludes.  
2. Previous literature  
2.1. The role of financial information in mergers and acquisitions 
Financial information has an important effect on investment decisions. It allows investors to 
estimate the intrinsic value and predict the future cash flows of firms (Dechow 1994; Barth, Cram, 
and Nelson 2001). It can also facilitate capital reallocation and improve investment efficiency by 
reducing agency costs and information asymmetries (Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi 2009). Lengthier 
10-K filings contain more information because, by construction, more detailed information 
requires longer filings. 
When two firms merge, they can create synergies. However, the pre-M&A evaluation of synergies 
is a non-trivial task. The process usually begins with preliminary due diligence, where the acquirer 
gathers publicly available information to estimate the target’s intrinsic value. This information 
should allow the acquirer to set the basic assumptions behind the pricing negotiations, and to 
estimate the synergies that can effect deal efficiency (Wangerin 2019). Next, the acquirer signs a 
confidentiality agreement, which is not publicly disclosed, and begins the due diligence review. 
The confidentiality agreement grants the acquirer access to private information about the target, 
which may include management reports, financial forecasts, and information on planned 
investments. Finally, the acquirer performs transactional due diligence to verify the accuracy of 
the target’s financial information. During this stage, the acquirer can choose to withdraw the offer 
or to complete the deal (Bruner 2004; Skaife and Wangerin 2013).  
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Several studies explore how various attributes of target firm financial statements influence the 
M&A process. For example, Rossi and Volpin (2004) show that better accounting quality increases 
the number of cross-border M&As. Koch, Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2012) find evidence that 
the premium paid for target firms is related to quarterly earnings guidance. McNichols and Stubben 
(2015) find that higher-quality accounting information improves the efficiency of merger 
decisions, while Marquardt and Zur (2015), using a measure of accrual quality, show that better 
accounting quality affects M&A deal structure. Moreover, Chen et al. (2018) find that acquirers 
are likely to make better M&A decisions if financial statements are comparable to those of industry 
peers. Generally, deals where target firms have better accounting quality are more likely to be 
structured as a negotiation process, to be completed, and to have shorter times to completion.  
Martin and Shalev (2016) find a positive correlation between firm-specific information (measured 
as target firm stock price movements that are not correlated with the market) and the benefits 
accruing from the deal. Raman, Shivakumar, and Tamayo (2013) provide evidence that the quality 
of a target’s earnings affects takeover decisions such as deal form, premium, and payment method. 
Following Davis, Piger, and Sedor (2012), we note that textual disclosure might be incrementally 
informative to quantitative earnings news. In contrast to prior studies, however, we seek to 





2.2. 10-K filing length and investment outcomes 
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Since the 1930s,3 the concept of readability, and how to measure it, has evolved dramatically. 
Recent studies have used the length of financial statements (and correlated measures) as 
readability-complexity indicators (e.g. Li 2008; Loughran and McDonald 2014). The information 
disclosed in financial statements is considered difficult to comprehend for the average user, and 
longer financial statements tend to be more difficult to read.  
Several studies have shown that the complexity of 10-K filings has important implications for 
investors and financial markets. For example, Lawrence (2013) shows that individuals tend to 
invest more heavily in firms that have shorter reports, while Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009) 
find that higher readability improves investment efficiency by reducing over- or 
underinvestment. Miller (2010) shows that more complex (longer, and thus less readable) filings 
are related to lower overall trading, while several studies report larger dispersions in analyst 
forecasts when filings are more complex (Lehavy, Li, and Merkley 2011; Loughran and McDonald 
2014). In an M&A context, Ahmed and Elshandidy (2016) find that conservative acquirers are less 
likely to initiate M&A deals.   
Bozanic and Thevenot (2015) examine how readability affects analysts’ 
information environments. They find that lower readability is associated with increased analyst 
uncertainty, but, over time, increased textual similarity reduces analyst uncertainty. Lang and 
Stice-Lawrence (2015) study the determinants and consequences of financial disclosure in an 
international setting. They find that firms with higher liquidity, institutional ownership, and 
analyst following tend to have higher levels of disclosure.  
                                                          
3 See Gray and Leary (1935) and DuBay (2007) for historical reviews of the readability literature. Kearney and Liu 
(2014) also provide a thorough review of textual analysis methods and models used in finance.  
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Unlike the previously discussed literature, which points to the negative effects of longer filings, 
some research suggests that longer filings may contain more value-relevant information. Bushee, 
Gow, and Taylor (2017) decompose the effect of complex language in quarterly earnings 
conference calls. They show that the complexity of language can represent both obfuscation and 
information, depending on the source. Li and Zhao (2015) show that 10-K filing disclosures have 
opposing effects on the evolution of uncertainty. Longer disclosures initially reflect complexity 
and increase uncertainty. However, once the new information is absorbed by investors, uncertainty 
tends to decrease.  
Given that firms’ voluntary disclosures contribute significantly to the length of firm 
filings (Cazier and Pfeiffer 2016), various studies have examined the effects of voluntary 
disclosures on market participants. Through the use of a questionnaire, Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal (2005) report CFO motives for voluntary disclosures. They conclude that firms use 
voluntary disclosure to enhance their reputation for transparent financial reporting, to reduce 
the information risk priced into their share prices, and to address the limitations of mandatory 
reporting.  
Guay, Samuels, and Taylor (2016) provide support for these findings by empirically 
showing that voluntary disclosures mitigate the negative effect of complex financial statements on 
the information environment. Conversely, building on You and Zhang (2009), who show that 
investor underreactions are stronger for more complex (longer) reports, Cazier and Pfeiffer (2016) 
examine which parts of 10-K filings tend to be the most difficult for investors to process. They 
distinguish between 10-K filing disclosures resulting from a firm’s operating complexity, SEC and 
GAAP disclosure requirements, and unrelated residual disclosures. The former categories are 
mainly influenced by mandatory disclosures, while the residual category consists of voluntary 
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disclosures. The study finds that residual disclosures are associated with a return drift six months 
after the 10-K filing date, but finds no such return drift for either operating complexity or 
regulatory disclosures. These results suggest that certain voluntary disclosures may be particularly 
difficult for market participants to process. 
3. Hypothesis development 
3.1. Target firm 10-K filing length and M&A returns 
There are many reasons for observing M&As. These include operational and financial synergies, 
strategic motives, financial distress, acquiring innovation, and managerial overconfidence (Roll 
1986; Lewellen 1971; Andrade and Stafford 2004; Harford 2005; Bernile, Lyandres, and Zhdanov 
2011; Almeida, Campello, and Hackbarth 2011). While M&As are generally expected to create 
value, empirical evidence suggests that acquirers on average make value-destroying or zero-gain 
acquisitions, and that most of the value accrues to the target firm (Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller 
2002). 
M&As are complex decisions, and often involve a certain degree of information asymmetry 
between the bidder and the target. It is well known that information asymmetry adversely affects 
financial markets (Akerlof 1970). In an M&A context, the risk of matching with a bad firm – or a 
“lemon” – adversely affects the prospects of the merged firm. Moreover, an M&A transaction can 
represent an information asymmetry game between the bidder and the target (Hansen 1987). The 
target agrees to the deal if the offer price is higher than or equal to its reservation price. The bidder 
agrees to the deal if the price is lower than the perceived target intrinsic value plus synergies.  
However, the intrinsic value of the target and the expected synergies are unknown to the bidder, 
and thus constitute a private estimate based on available information. This is not trivial under 
asymmetric information. On the one hand, it is in the best interest of both players to maximize 
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synergies. On the other hand, both parties must decide how these synergies should be shared. And 
the sharing ultimately depends on the bargaining position of each party.  
We expect information in target firm 10-K filings to play a crucial role in the success of an M&A 
deal in at least two ways (Bushman and Smith 2001). First, by estimating potential synergies and 
attributing value to the target firm, it helps acquirers identify good targets. Therefore, in the 
absence of a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, increased availability of 
financial information about the target should facilitate the acquirer’s assessment of the target firm, 
hence enhancing M&A outcomes. Furthermore, information in 10-K filings allows shareholders 
to better estimate the potential synergies that may arise from the proposed M&A deal.  
Second, in the case of an agency conflict between management and market participants, accounting 
information can improve the efficiency of the merger decision through its governance role. There 
are several reasons for potential inefficiencies relating to merger decisions when management is 
entrenched. Theories based on managerial self-interest explain negative M&A announcement 
returns and value destruction to the acquirer. For example, agency theory relates to the conflict 
between shareholders and managers (Jensen 1986), while the hubris theory of Roll (1986) is based 
on managerial overconfidence. And Goel and Thakor’s (2010) theory is based on envy-based 
motivations to merge.  
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) explain wealth destruction, which can result from managerial 
desire for larger firm size and diversification. Gorton, Matthias, and Rosen (2009) describe 
negative M&A announcement returns by reconciling these neoclassical theories with the 
managerial preference for not being acquired. Moreover, Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) show 
that acquisitions undertaken by entrenched managers are the most value-destroying.  
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If 10-K filing length is a result of the information contained therein, lengthier filings should contain 
more information about the target firm than shorter ones. Greater information availability about a 
target should reduce information acquisition costs for shareholders. This should give rise to a 
positive association between target firm 10-K filing length and shareholders’ perceptions of M&A 
outcomes. We call this effect the information acquisition cost effect, and formalize it in the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a: There is a positive association between target firm 10-K filing length and M&A 
returns. 
However, as shown in the prior section, longer 10-K filings may also be more complex, and 
therefore less readable. Furthermore, prior literature has shown that 10-K filing length can be used 
to obfuscate information (Li 2008; Lehavy, Li, and Merkley 2011; Loughran and McDonald 2014). 
Hence, market participants may face greater difficulty extracting information from 10-K filings, 
and thus increased information processing costs. All else being equal, an increase in shareholders’ 
information processing costs would increase market information asymmetry about M&A deal 
outcomes. This could lead to a negative association between target firm 10-K filing length and 
market participants’ perceptions of M&A outcomes. We call this effect the information processing 
cost effect, and formalize it in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a negative association between target firm 10-K filing length and M&A 
returns. 
 
Given that the reduction in information acquisition costs and the increase in information processing 
costs are not mutually exclusive, the relation between target firm 10-K filing length and M&A 
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returns depends on which of the two effects dominates. If the reduction in information acquisition 
costs dominates, we should find a positive association between target firm 10-K filing length and 
M&A returns. This result would support Hypothesis 1a. If the increase in information processing 
costs dominates, we should find a negative association between target firm 10-K filing length and 
M&A returns. This result would support Hypothesis 1b. Finally, if the two effects cancel out each 
other, we should find no association between 10-K filing length and M&A returns. 
3.2. Cross-sectional analysis: Private information, 10-K filing length, and M&A returns 
As discussed in section 2.1, the acquirer’s due diligence of the target firm is typically split into 
distinct phases: 1) preliminary due diligence, 2) signing of a confidentiality agreement, and 3) 
transactional due diligence. In the first phase, the acquirer relies solely on public information; in 
the second phase, after signing a confidentiality agreement, the acquirer has access to private 
information. Finally, in the third phase, the acquirer engages in transactional due diligence to verify 
the accuracy of the target’s financial information, and can then either withdraw the offer or 
complete the deal.  
We predict the information in the target firm 10-K filing will be most useful to the acquirer when 
it has limited access to private information about the target. Hence, we posit that the relation 
between 10-K filing length and M&A returns will be stronger in this case. We formalize our second 
hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: The association between 10-K filing length and M&A returns is stronger when the 
acquirer has limited private information about the target. 
 
3.3. Cross-sectional analysis: 10-K filing quality, 10-K filing length, and M&A returns 
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In the previous sections, we examine how the quantity, but not the quality, of information in target 
10-K filings influences M&A returns. We posit that the relation between 10-K filing length 
(quantity of information) and M&A efficiency is a function of the quality of information. We 
distinguish between two types of information: (1) textual information, which consists of firm 
disclosures, and (2) financial information, which consists of financial statements. The quality of 
this information may have differing effects on the relation between target firm 10-K filing length 
and M&A returns. 
The quality of narrative information in 10-K filings has typically been measured through 
readability metrics (Loughran and McDonald 2014). Less readable text is considered more 
complex, and hence of lower quality. Specifically, we expect that target firm 10-K filings 
exhibiting high textual complexity will be more difficult for shareholders to read and understand. 
The increased difficulty will increase shareholder processing costs, and offset the benefits arising 
from a reduction in information acquisition costs. Prior literature (e.g. Li 2008; Loughran and 
McDonald 2013) identified a negative relation between 10-K filings with low readability metrics 
and market returns. If low readability reduces the benefits of lengthier 10-K filings, then we expect 
a weaker relation between 10-K filing length and M&A returns for deals involving target firms 
with low-quality 10-K filing narratives. 
To further test for the effect of filing quality, we also examine how the quality of financial 
information may impact the relation between 10-K filing length and M&A returns. Higher-quality 
financial statements are more informative to financial statement users, and, hence, require less 
explanation. Given this, we expect that lengthier filings will be less useful to shareholders when 
the accounting quality of the financial statements is high. We expect the relation to be weaker 
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when the target firm filing contains high-quality financial information. We formalize our third 
hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: The association between 10-K filing length and M&A returns is weaker when the 
target firm filing contains low-quality textual information or high-quality financial information.  
3.4. Cross-sectional analysis: 10-K filing tone, 10-K filing length, and M&A returns 
The relation between 10-K filing length and M&A returns is also likely to be a function of the 
content of the filing. Specifically, shareholders will find lengthier 10-K filings more useful in their 
assessment of the target firm if they contain text denoting risk or uncertainty. In this case, market 
participants will require explanations for the sources of risks and how the firm will address them. 
Hence, we posit that the relation between target firm 10-K filing length and M&A returns will be 
stronger when the 10-K filing narrative denotes high risk. We formalize our fourth hypothesis as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 4: The association between 10-K filing length and M&A returns is stronger when the 
target firm 10-K filing narrative denotes high risk.  
 
4. Research design 
We use a multivariate regression model to study the association between target 10-K filing length 
and M&A returns. We use two market return-based measures to capture M&A returns: (1) the 
acquirer’s (CAR), and (2) SYNERGY. Following Chen et al. (2018), we calculate SYNERGY as the 
weighted average of the acquirers’ and targets’ CARs. Both variables measure shareholders’ 
perceived net benefit of the M&A transaction. CARs are measured for the three-day window 
beginning one trading day before and ending one trading day after the announcement date. 
Abnormal returns (𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡) are measured as the difference between the actual stock return for firm j 
at day t (𝑅𝑗𝑡) and the return predicted by Equation (1) below:  
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𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝑅𝑗𝑡 − (𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑅𝑚𝑡)      (1) 
We run the market model over the period beginning 210 days prior to and ending 11 days prior to 
the announcement date, where 𝑅𝑚 is the market return and 𝛼𝑗 and 𝛽𝑗 are the parameters estimated 
by an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model.4  
Following prior studies (e.g. Loughran and McDonald 2014), we measure 10-K filing length as 
the mean number of words in the target 10-K filing for the three years prior to the M&A 
announcement date, NWORDS.5 We standardize this variable so that it has a mean of 0 and a 
standard deviation of 1. The relevant data about target 10-K filings comes from the WRDS SEC 
Analytics Suite. Moreover, given that the relation between NWORDS and M&A returns might not 
be linear, in our regression model, Equation (2), we include the squared transformation of the 
variable capturing 10-K filing length, NWORDS^2. In Equation (2), we regress M&A returns on 
NWORDS, NWORDS^2, controls, year, and industry fixed effects.6 Standard errors are clustered 
by year and by Fama-French industry codes. 
M&A returns = α +β NWORDS + λ NWORDS^2+ γ Controls + Year F.E. + Industry F.E. + ε  
 (2) 
The control variables included in Equation (2) are standard in the literature (Fuller, Netter, and 
Stegemoller 2002; Raman, Shivakumar, and Tamayo 2013; Chen et al., 2018). Specifically, we 
                                                          
4 In untabulated results, we run the analyses with CAR calculated as 1) a simple return, 2) a Fama-French three-factor 
model, and 3) a Carhart four-factor model. Our inferences remain the same as those presented here. 
5 We recognize that the choice of calculating NWORDS for the three years prior to the announcement date is ad hoc. 
To check whether our results are sensitive to this research design choice, in untabulated results, we re-run our 
analysis using NWORDS calculated over the five years prior to the announcement date. Our inferences remain the 
same as those presented here. 
6 The inclusion of year fixed effects allows us to control for time trends in the environment in which the firms in our 
sample operate. Specifically, we control for changes in regulations, industry practices, and trust between market 
participants (Chambers and Dimson, 2009). Through the use of industry fixed effects we are also able to control for 
time-invariant industry characteristics.  
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include: (1) target and acquirer firm characteristics, such as firm size, Tobin’s q, leverage, return 
on assets, and target firm stock synchronicity, (2) deal characteristics, such as payment method, 
and an indicator variable showing whether the deal is a diversifying acquisition, (3) target bid-ask 
spread, to capture target firm market information asymmetry, (4) accounting quality of the target’s 
financial statements, and (5) controls for the target firm information environment, such as stock 
exchange, an indicator variable for whether the target operates in a high tech industry, an indicator 
variable for whether the target was in play, and the number of analysts following the target firm.7 
5. Data and sample construction 
Our initial M&A sample consists of U.S. public acquirers of U.S. public targets for the 1997-2013 
period, and comes from the SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions Thomson One database. To 
ensure an M&A transaction is of a significant size for the acquirer, we apply the following 
criteria: (1) the acquirer must own less than 50% of the target’s stock before the M&A 
announcement, (2) the acquirer must own 100% of the target’s shares after the M&A deal is 
completed, (3) the M&A deal value must exceed U.S. $1 million, and (4) the M&A deal value 
must be more than 1% of the acquirer’s market capitalization. We also require that information for 
both the acquirer and the target for each deal be available on CRSP and Compustat. Finally, we 
exclude deals for which data on target 10-K filing length for the three years prior to the 
announcement date are not available in the WRDS SEC Analytics Suite. The final sample consists 
of 605 deals.8 
                                                          
7 See the appendix for variable definitions. 
8 We acknowledge that our sample size is smaller than those in prior studies due to the requirement to obtain data on 
target 10-K filing length for the three years prior to the announcement date (e.g. Fu, Lin, and Officer 2013; Kisgen 
and Song 2009). Without this selection criterion, it would be otherwise comparable. 
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Table 1 shows the yearly average number of words in target 10-K filings and the sample 
breakdown by year.9 Consistent with prior studies, our sample exhibits the well documented 
merger wave pattern, with one peak around 1998-1999, and a second around 2006-2007. 
Moreover, in line with prior studies, we find that the average yearly number of words in target 10-
K filings increased, from a low of 19,165 in 1997, to a high of 47,931 in 2012.  
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for our sample. On average, acquirers have a mean negative 
return (CAR) of around 1% and a standard deviation of 8.2%. CAR ranges from a negative 63%, 
exhibited by Thoratec Cardiosystems Inc., when it announced its acquisition of Thermo 
Cardiosystems Inc., to a positive 30%, exhibited by FOCUS Enhancements Inc., when it 
announced its acquisition of Videonics Inc. 
The mean weighted CAR for both target and acquirer around the announcement date, SYNERGY, 
is 2.7%. The fact that mean SYNERGY is positive when mean CAR is negative suggests that the 
mean target CAR around the announcement date is positive. These summary statistics are very 
similar to those found in previous studies, e.g., Raman, Shivakumar, and Tamayo (2013) and 
McNichols and Stubben (2015). 
[Please insert Table 2 here] 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix. Our proxy for target 10-K filing length, NWORDS, is 
positively correlated with the measures for M&A returns, albeit significant at only the 5% level 
for SYNERGY. The positive correlation between NWORDS and our variables of interest is evident 
from Figure 1, where we graphically show the relationship between the two measures for M&A 
                                                          
9 The yearly average number of words in target 10-K filings is the unlogged NWORDS.  
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returns and NWORDS. These graphs show an increase in both our proxies for M&A returns and 
10-K filing length over the sample period. The univariate results suggest support for a positive 
association between 10-K filing length and M&A returns, hence providing support for Hypothesis 
1a. 
As expected, we find a positive significant correlation between SYNERGY and CAR. The results 
for the control variables suggest that the correlation between both the acquirer’s and the target’s 
Tobin’s q and M&A returns is negative. These univariate results suggest that M&A transactions 
involving acquirer and target firms that have greater investment opportunities are perceived 
negatively by market participants. Furthermore, the results indicate that M&A transactions 
involving financially constrained (high leverage) acquirers are viewed positively by market 
participants, which leads to better M&A returns. 
[Please insert Table 3 and Figure 1 here] 
To further examine the relation between 10-K filing length and M&A efficiency, we undertake a 
univariate analysis. Specifically, we divide our sample into quartiles based on the number of words 
in target firm 10-K filings, NWORDS, and compare the measures of M&A returns between the top 
and bottom quartiles. The top (bottom) quartile consists of a sample of observations where the 
target firm has lengthier (shorter) 10-K filings. As shown in Table 4, we find that observations in 
the bottom quartile (Quartile 1) exhibit lower M&A returns than those in the top quartile (Quartile 
4). We use  parametric (t-test) and non-parametric (Wilcoxon rank-sum) tests to test for differences 
in M&A returns between the two quartiles. For both, we find that M&A returns for observations 
in the top quartile are statistically larger than for those in the bottom quartile. These results provide 
support for the notion that the reduction in information acquisition costs dominates the increase in 
information processing costs stemming from lengthier 10-K filings. 
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[Please insert Table 4 here] 
6. Results 
6.1. Main results 
Given that the univariate results discussed in the previous section may be driven by an omitted 
correlated variable, we undertake a series of multivariate regression analyses. Table 5 presents the 
results from estimating Equation (2), where the dependent variable is one of the two measures for 
M&A returns, and the independent variable of interest is our measure of 10-K filing length 
(NWORDS).  
For both measures of M&A returns, the coefficient on NWORDS is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that longer reports are associated with higher CAR and higher 
SYNERGY. Economic significance is also important. We find that a 1-standard deviation increase 
in NWORDS results in a 70-basis point increase in CAR and a 61-basis point increase in SYNERGY. 
For the median firm in our sample, this represents an 8.54% increase in acquirer CAR, and a 7.72% 
increase in weighted CAR for the acquirer and target firms (SYNERGY).10 These results, which are 
in line with the univariate results discussed in the prior section, provide support for Hypothesis 1a, 
and suggest that the reduction in information acquisition costs dominates the increase in 
information processing costs emanating from lengthier 10-K filings. The coefficient on 
NWORDS^2 is negative, albeit insignificant. This suggests that any attenuation in the positive 
effect of 10-K filing length on M&A returns is insignificantly different from zero. In line with the 
univariate results discussed in the previous section, we find a positive correlation between acquirer 
                                                          
10 The NWORDS standard deviation is 1.0. The effect on CAR (SYNERGY) is the NWORDS standard deviation (1.0) 
multiplied by the coefficient on NWORDS when CAR (SYNERGY) is the dependent variable, 0.0070 (0.0061). The 
effect on CAR (SYNERGY) is 0.0070 (0.0061). To capture the economic significance of the results, we scale the 
effect on CAR (SYNERGY) by the median CAR (SYNERGY) for our sample, 0.082 (0.079). Hence, a 1-standard 
deviation in NWORDS increases the sample mean CAR (SYNERGY) by 8.54% (7.72%). 
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leverage (ACQ_LEV) and M&A returns. This suggests that M&A deals involving financially 
constrained acquirers are perceived positively.  
Moreover, in line with Offenberg and Pirinsky (2015, p. 331), who find that deals “in more 
competitive environments and deals with fewer external impediments on execution are more likely 
to be structured as tender offers,” we find a significant positive association between TENDER and 
M&A returns. Finally, we find a negative and significant association between HIGH_TECH and 
M&A returns, suggesting that M&A deals involving complex target firms (such as those operating 
in the high-tech industry) have lower M&A returns than the average deal in our sample. 
[Please insert Table 5 here] 
 
6.2. Cross-sectional analysis: Private information, 10-K filing length, and M&A returns  
To test Hypothesis 2, we need to measure acquirer access to private information about the target 
firm. We proxy for this in two ways: First, we hand-collect data on when the confidentiality 
agreements were signed from the merger background section of SEC filings 14A, S-4, and 14D. 
We then introduce an interaction term in Equation (2) between a new indicator variable, 
TOP_25_DAYS and NWORDS. TOP_25_DAYS equals 1 if the number of days between the date 
the confidentiality agreement was signed and the M&A announcement date is in the top quartile 
(less than thirty-nine days), and 0 otherwise. Second, we classify the sampled M&A deals 
according to their form. Specifically, we interact AUCTION with NWORDS, where AUCTION is 
an indicator variable that equals 1 if the M&A deal takes the form of an auction, and 0 otherwise. 
Similar to Boone and Mulherin (2007), we define an M&A deal as an auction if the target firm has 




We expect the acquirer to have less private information about the target firm when the period of 
time between the signing of the confidentiality agreement and the M&A announcement date is 
short, and when the M&A deal takes the form of an auction. When the acquirer has limited access 
to private information about the target firm, acquirers will find target firm 10-K filings more useful. 
Thus, the coefficient on the interaction terms between NWORDS and the measures for limited 
access to private information should be positive and significant. For this analysis, we drop some 
observations due to limited data availability. 
We present the results for this analysis in Table 6. Panel A shows the results when we proxy for 
limited access to private information using the length of time between the signing of the 
confidentiality agreement and the M&A announcement date; panel B shows the results when we 
proxy for limited access to private information using the form of the M&A deal. In line with our 
prediction, we find that the coefficient on the interaction term NWORDS*TOP_25_DAYS is 
positive for both measures of M&A returns, albeit significant only for SYNERGY. Similarly, we 
find that the interaction term between NWORDS and AUCTION, NWORDS*AUCTION, is positive 
and significant at the 5% level for both measures. These results are consistent with the notion that 
the market’s perception of an M&A deal is more positive for longer 10-K filings if the acquirer 
has limited access to private information about the target.  
[Please insert Table 6 here] 
6.3. Cross-sectional analysis: 10-K filing quality, 10-K filing length, and M&A returns 
Hypothesis 3 posits that the relation between 10-K filing length (quantity of information in the 
filing) and M&A efficiency is a function of the quality of information in the filing. Specifically, 
Hypothesis 3 distinguishes between textual quality and accounting quality, and suggests that the 
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relation between target 10-K filing length and M&A returns is weaker when textual quality is low 
and accounting quality is high. 
Similar to prior literature (e.g. Loughran and McDonald 2013, 2014) we capture textual quality 
using the following measures of language complexity: the Gunning Fog index, FOG, the SMOG 
grading index, SMOG, and the Flesch reading ease index. Given that the Flesch index increases 
with a reduction in language complexity, to facilitate exposition, we use the inverse, FLESCH, in 
our empirical analysis. Hence, FOG, SMOG, and FLESCH increase with greater language 
complexity. We calculate these variables as the averages for the target 10-K filings for the three 
years prior to the M&A announcement date. To ensure that the high correlation among these 
additional variables does not bias our results, we run the analysis using each measure of language 
complexity separately. 
Table 7 presents the results of this analysis. Panel A shows the results when CAR is the dependent 
variable, and panel B shows the results when SYNERGY is the dependent variable. In all 
specifications, the coefficient on NWORDS is consistently positive and significant, suggesting that 
the positive relation between 10-K filing length and M&A returns holds regardless of 10-K 
language complexity. In line with our expectations, the coefficients on the interactions between 
NWORDS and our measures for language complexity are consistently negative, albeit significant 
only for NWORDS*FOG and NWORDS*FLESCH when CAR is the dependent variable. Taken 
together, these results suggest that (1) 10-K filing length, NWORDS, captures a characteristic of 
the target 10-K filing that is distinct from language complexity, and (2) language complexity 
attenuates the positive relation between NWORDS and market returns. 
[Please insert Table 7 here] 
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To test whether the quality of financial information in the target 10-K filing, accounting quality, 
influences the association between NWORDS and market returns, we interact our measure of 
accounting quality, AQ, with NWORDS. AQ captures the quality of the financial statements 
disclosed in the 10-K filing. Higher-quality statements are more informative to financial statement 
users, and, hence, require less explanation. In other words, we expect the coefficient on the 
interaction term NWORDS*AQ to be negative and significant. 
Table 8 presents the results for this analysis. In line with our expectations, the coefficient on the 
interaction term NWORDS*AQ is negative for both measures of M&A returns, albeit only 
significant for CAR. Moreover, we find that the coefficient on NWORDS is positive and significant, 
suggesting that the positive relation between NWORDS and M&A returns holds regardless of 
accounting quality.  




6.4. Cross-sectional analysis: 10-K language tone, 10-K filing length, and M&A returns 
To test Hypothesis 4, we create a new variable, TONE, to capture the incidence of text that denotes 
high risk. TONE is computed as the sum of the relative amount of words denoting uncertainty and 
modal weakness in the target 10-K filing. We define those words by using the Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) word dictionaries.  
To formally test our hypothesis, we introduce a new indicator variable, TOP_25_TONE, in 
Equation (2), and interact it with NWORDS. TOP_25_TONE equals 1 when TONE is in the top 
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quartile, and 0 otherwise. If our prediction that lengthier 10-K filings are incrementally informative 
to shareholders in the presence of words that denote greater target firm risk is correct, we expect 
the coefficient on the interaction terms to be positive and significant. 
Table 9 presents the results of this analysis. In line with our expectations, the coefficient on 
NWORDS*TOP_25_TONE is positive and significant, suggesting that the association between 10-
K filing length and M&A returns is stronger when the filing contains words denoting risk. 
Furthermore, the coefficient on NWORDS is positive and significant. This suggests that lengthier 
10-K filings are more informative to shareholders regardless of the tone of the disclosures. The 
coefficient on TOP_25_TONE is negative and significant, indicating that riskier target firms tend 
to lead to less successful M&A transactions.  
[Please insert Table 9 here] 
7. Robustness tests 
7.1. Abnormal number of words 
Next, we test whether our results are sensitive to the way we calculate NWORDS by substituting 
it with the variable ABNWORDS (abnormal number of words) in our models. We compute 
ABNWORDS as the difference between the actual and expected number of words for that firm-
year. Expected number of words (ENWORDS) is computed using the coefficients for the variables 
in Equation (3), which we run on all M&A transactions available on the SDC Thomson One 
database for our sample period, and for which we have the required data. Equation (3) gives the 
expected number of words in the 10-K filing for each observation in our sample. The difference 
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between the actual and expected number of words can be attributed to cross-sectional differences 
in voluntary disclosures of our sampled firms.11 
NOWORDS= α + βSIZE + Year F.E. + Industry F.E. + ε    (3) 
NOWORDS is the logarithmic transformation of the number of words for each firm-year in our 
sample. The abnormal number of words for each firm-year is calculated as the difference between 
NOWORDS and ENWORDS. Similar to NWORDS, ABNWORDS is calculated as the average for 
each firm over the three-year period beginning in the third year prior to the M&A announcement 
date, and ending in the year just prior to it. 
In Table 10, we present the results for Equation (2) when substituting NWORDS with 
ABNWORDS. The results confirm our previous inferences, and show that longer filings are 
positively associated with M&A returns. Specifically, we show a positive and significant 
relationship at the 1% level between ABNWORDS and the two measures of M&A returns. The 
coefficients on the control variables are similar to the results for our main analysis. 
[Please insert Table 10 here] 
 
 
7.2. Public information about the target 
The narratives in 10-K filings provide market participants with information to estimate the 
optimality of investment decisions. However, when significant public information about the target 
already exists, the usefulness of that information may become less important. To ensure the 
                                                          
11 As suggested by prior literature (e.g. Cazier and Pfeiffer 2016), size and industry should explain most of the 
mandatory disclosures required by a specific firm. Furthermore, we include year fixed effects to control for changes 
in mandatory disclosure regulations over our sample period. 
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observed relation between NWORDS and market returns is not driven by public information over 
and above what is available in the target 10-K filing, we exclude M&A transactions where 
significant public information about the target is likely to exist. Specifically, we drop any deals 
where the target was subject to previous shareholder activism, or was previously targeted by a 
potential acquirer during the three years prior to the M&A announcement date. The SEC requires 
investors who acquire beneficial ownership of more than 5% of the voting class of a company’s 
securities to file an SC 13D filing, often called a “beneficial ownership report.” By matching this 
data, sourced from Audit Analytics, to our sample of target firms, we can identify and exclude 
firms that were subject to shareholder activism. Our sample for this analysis consists of 411 
observations. 
Table 11 presents the results. Similarly to our base regression, we find a positive relationship 
between NWORDS and M&A returns. This relationship is significant at the 1% level for both CAR 
and SYNERGY.  
[Please insert Table 11 here] 
7.3. Additional controls 
To further alleviate concerns that our results are driven by correlated omitted variables, we conduct 
various robustness tests where we add additional control variables to Equation (2). Specifically, 
we control for the acquirer availability of information about the target firm, target firm risk, and 
target firm complexity.  
To control for acquirer availability of information about the target firm, we add COMMON_AU 
and K8_COUNT. COMMON_AU is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the target shares a 
common auditor with the acquirer and 0 otherwise. It controls for the possibility that the acquirer 
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may have easier access to information about the target firm when they share a common auditor. 
K8_COUNT is the total number of 8-K filings issued by the target firm in the three years prior to 
the M&A deal. This variable controls for the target firm management’s voluntary disclosures. 
To control for target firm risk, we add TRG_VOL, TRG_FRG, and STD_CFO to our model. 
TRG_VOL is target firm stock return volatility. It is calculated as the standard deviation of the 
target firm’s monthly returns over the three years prior to the M&A deal. TRG_FRG is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the target firm operates in a fragmented industry, and 0 otherwise. 
STD_CFO is cash flow volatility. It is calculated as the standard deviation of operating cash flows 
scaled by total assets over the three years prior to the M&A deal.  
Finally, to control for target firm complexity, we follow Li (2008), and include in our model 
SPEC_ITEMS_D, LBUSSEG, LGEOSEG, and LTOTNOMISS. SPEC_ITEMS_D is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the absolute value of special items scaled by total assets is in the top 
quartile, and 0 otherwise. LBUSSEG (LGEOSEG) is the log of the number of business (geographic) 
segments from Compustat segment firms. It controls for the possibility that firms with more 
complex operations have lengthier 10-K filings. LTOTNOMISS proxies for financial complexity, 
and is computed as the log of non-missing variables in Compustat. This variable controls for the 
possibility that target firms exhibiting greater financial complexity have lengthier 10-K filings. 
Table 12 presents the results for this analysis. Panel A shows the results when the dependent 
variable is CAR, and panel B shows the results when the dependent variable is SYNERGY. In the 
first column of both panels, we add the controls relating to the availability of information about 
the target. In the second column, we add the controls relating to target firm risk, and, in the third 
column, we add the controls relating to target firm complexity. Finally, in the fourth column, we 
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add all the additional controls in one regression model. As evident from the results (and in line 
with our main results), we find that NWORDS is positive and significant when either CAR or 
SYNERGY is the dependent variable. 
[Please insert Table 12 here] 
7.4. Additional tests 
To ensure that correlated omitted variables are not driving our results, we conduct a number of 
additional tests. First, we analyze how different dimensions of target firm risk influence the 
association between 10-K filing length and M&A returns. We create a variable that proxies for the 
financial risk of the target firm, FIN_RISK, which equals 1 if the target firm leverage is higher than 
the sample mean, and 0 otherwise. We interact NWORDS with FIN_RISK, and include this 
interaction in Equation (2). In untabulated results, we find that the interaction term is positive and 
significant, suggesting that lengthier 10-K filings are more informative for investors in the case of 
target firms that are subject to higher financial risk.  
In another analysis, we create a variable that proxies for regulatory risk approval, REG_RISK, 
which equals 1 if the target firm operates in a highly regulated industry, such as healthcare, medical 
equipment, or pharmaceuticals, and 0 otherwise. We interact NWORDS with REG_RISK, and 
include this interaction in Equation (2). In untabulated results, we find that the interaction term is 
positive and significant, which suggests that lengthier 10-K filings are more informative in 
industries that are subject to greater regulatory risk.  
Second, we examine whether the observed relation between target firm 10-K filing length and 
M&A returns is influenced by trust. Specifically, we posit that information in target 10-K filings 
will be most useful in an environment where trust between market participants is less prevalent. 
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In such an environment, shareholders will demand more information about the target firm in order 
to independently assess deal success. Conversely, lengthy 10-K filings may be less useful in an 
environment where market participants trust the target firm.  
To examine this proposition, we divide our sample between M&A deals where (1) the acquirer 
and target have different auditors, and (2) the acquirer and target have the same auditor. The former 
proxies for a low-trust environment while the latter proxies for a high-trust environment. In 
untabulated results, we find that NWORDS is only positive and significant for firms that do not 
share a common auditor. This suggests that more information has the most value in a low-trust 
environment. Put differently, information in lengthier financial statements matters most for deals 
that do not have trust established through audit networks.  
Finally, we test whether investor characteristics affect the relation between target 10-K filing 
length and M&A returns. We create a dummy variable, IO, that equals 1 if the target and acquirer 
institutional ownership is greater than the mean for the sample, and 0 otherwise. We interact 
NWORDS with IO to examine the incremental effect of the presence of institutional ownership on 
the relation between target 10-K filing length and M&A returns. In untabulated analyses, we find 
that the interaction term has a positive and significant effect on M&A returns. This suggests that 
institutional investors are better able to extract value from lengthy M&A reports.  
8. Conclusion 
This study examines the relation between 10-K filing length and M&A returns. On the one hand, 
lengthier 10-K filings contain more information, thereby reducing information acquisition costs 
and enabling market participants to better assess the likelihood of M&A deal success. This effect 
suggests a positive association between 10-K filing length and M&A returns. On the other hand, 
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longer 10-K filings are more complex, thereby increasing information processing costs and 
potentially hindering the extraction of meaningful information from the target 10-K filing. This 
effect suggests a negative association between 10-K filing length and M&A returns. In this study, 
we aim to determine which of these two effects dominates. 
Using a sample of U.S. M&A transactions for public firms over the 1997-2013 period, we study 
the relation between target 10-K filing length and M&A returns. In both univariate and multivariate 
analyses, we find that the acquirer cumulative abnormal return and the weighted sum of the target 
and acquirer cumulative abnormal returns are higher around the M&A announcement date when 
the target 10-K filings are longer. This suggests that the reduction in information acquisition costs 
stemming from lengthier 10-K filings dominates the increase in information processing costs. In 
cross-sectional analyses, we find that the association between 10-K filing length and M&A returns 
is a function of acquirers’ access to private information about the target, the quality of information 
in the 10-K filing, and language complexity in the 10-K filing.   
We subject these results to a series of robustness tests. We test whether our results hold when we 
(1) change our measure for 10-K filing length, (2) exclude observations for M&A transactions 
where the target was subject to shareholder activism or previous acquisitions, and (3) control for 
the availability of information on the target firm, target firm risk, and target firm complexity. 
Results for these tests confirm our inferences. We also find that lengthier 10-K filings are more 
informative to M&A investors if: (1) the target firm operates in industries that are subject to more 
regulatory risk, (2) the target firm is more leveraged, (3) neither the target nor the acquirer firm 
can establish sufficient trust through audit networks, and (4) the majority owners of the target and 
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Appendix 1. Variable definitions. 
 
Variable Name Description [Source] 
Dependent Variables  
CAR Three-day cumulative abnormal return of the acquirer around the M&A announcement 
date, calculated using the market model over days (-210, -11) with an ordinary least 
squares model [CRSP]. 
SYNERGY Sum of the weighted three-day acquirer and target cumulative abnormal returns around 
the M&A announcement date, calculated using the market model over days (-210, -11) 




NWORDS Standardized value of the mean number of words in the target 10-K filing for the three-
year period from the three years prior to the M&A announcement to the year just prior to 
the M&A announcement [SEC Analytics]. 
NWORDS^2 Squared value of NWORDS. 
ABNWORDS Abnormal mean number of words in the target 10-K filing, calculated as the difference 
between the actual and expected number of words. The expected number of words is 
calculated using the coefficients from the following regression, run on all observations in 
the sample: NOWORDSit = α + βSIZEit + Year F.E. + Industry F.E. + ε, where 
NOWORDS is the logarithmic transformation of the number of words for each firm-year 
in our sample period. The abnormal number of words for each firm-year is calculated as 
the difference between NOWORDS and ENWORDS. Similarly to NWORDS, ABNWORDS 
is calculated for each firm as the average over the three-year period beginning in the third 
year prior to the M&A announcement date and ending in the year just prior to the 
announcement date [SEC Analytics]. 
Acquirer Characteristics  
ACQ_LEV  
 
Acquirer’s pre-acquisition leverage, measured as the sum of long- and short-term debt 




Acquirer’s return on assets for the year ending prior to the announcement year, measured 
as operating income before depreciation, scaled by average total assets [Compustat]. 
ACQ_SIZE  
 
Acquirer’s size, measured as the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s market value at the 
end of the quarter prior to the announcement [CRSP, Compustat]. 
ACQ_TOBINQ  
 
Acquirer’s pre-acquisition Tobin’s Q, measured as the ratio of the acquirer’s market value 
of assets to the book value of assets at the fiscal year-end prior to an acquisition 
announcement [Compustat]. 
Target Characteristics  
TRG_LEV  
 
Target’s pre-acquisition leverage, measured as the sum of long- and short-term debt 




Target’s return on assets for the year ending prior to the announcement year, measured as 
operating income before depreciation scaled by average total assets [Compustat]. 
TRG_SIZE  
 
Target’s size, measured as the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s market value at the end 
of the quarter prior to the announcement [CRSP, Compustat]. 
TRG_TOBINQ  
 
Target’s pre-acquisition Tobin’s Q, measured as the ratio of the acquirer’s market value 





Deal Characteristics  
39 
 
ALL_STOCK Indicator variable that equals 1 if the acquisition was at least 90% financed by acquirer 
stocks, and 0 otherwise [Thomson One SDC]. 
ANALYST Logarithmic transformation of the maximum number of analysts that submitted 
recommendations about the firm at any point in time during the year [I/B/E/S]. 
AQ Target’s accrual quality, measured by the standard deviation of firm-level residuals from 
Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model during years t-5 to t-1, multiplied by -1 and ranked 
by decile [Compustat]. 
AUCTION Indicator variable that equals 1 if the target approached multiple bidders and multiple 




Indicator variable that equals 1 if the acquirer and target are in different industries based 
on Fama-French industry classifications, and 0 otherwise [Thomson One SDC]. 
HIGH_TECH Indicator variable that equals 1 if the acquirer and target are both from high-tech industries 
as defined in Loughran and Ritter (2004), and 0 otherwise [Thomson One SDC]. 
IN_PLAY Indicator variable that equals 1 if the target was subject to another acquisition within the 
three years before the deal announcement date, and 0 otherwise [Thomson One SDC]. 
NASDAQ Indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange, and 
0 otherwise [Compustat]. 
REL_SIZE Relative deal size, measured as the ratio of the transaction value to the market value of 
the bidder [Thomson One SDC, CRSP]. 
SYNC Target’s stock return synchronicity, measured as the adjusted R2 from a regression of a 
firm’s daily stock return on the daily market return over the sixteen quarters prior to the 
focal year [CRSP]. 
TENDER Indicator variable that equals 1 if the acquisition is classified as a tender offer, and 0 
otherwise [Thomson One SDC]. 
TRG_BID_ASK Average target daily bid-ask spreads (scaled by the midpoint of the spread) over the one-
year period ending two months prior to the deal announcement [CRSP]. 
Additional Controls  
COMMON_AU 
Equals 1 if the target and acquirer firm have the same auditor, and 0 otherwise [Audit 
Analytics]. 
K8_COUNT 
Total number of 8-K filings during the three years prior to the M&A announcement date 
[SEC Edgar]. 
LBUSSEG Natural logarithm of the number of business segments [Compustat]. 
LGEOSEG Natural logarithm of the number of geographic segments [Compustat]. 
LTOTNONMISS Natural logarithm of the number of non-missing items [Compustat]. 
SPEC_ITEMS_D 
Equals 1 if the target has special items in absolute value divided by total assets in the top 
25th percentile, and 0 otherwise [Compustat]. 
STD_CFO Volatility of cash flows [Compustat]. 
TRG_FRG Equals 1 if the target is in fragmented industries, and 0 otherwise [Compustat]. 
TRG_VOL Stock return volatility [CRSP]. 
TOP_25_DAYS 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the number of days between the signing of the 
confidentiality agreement and the announcement date is in the top quartile, and 0 
otherwise. 
TOP_25_TONE 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if TONE is in the top quartile, and 0 otherwise. TONE is 
defined as the sum of the relative amount of words denoting uncertainty and modal 
weakness, as defined in the Loughran and McDonald (2014) word dictionaries. 
FLESCH Inverse of the Flesch reading ease index. 
SMOG Smog grading index. 
FOG 10-K filing Gunning Fog index. 
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Figure 1. M&A returns and 10-K length. 
 
This figure shows the relation between M&A returns and 10-K filing length. The sample includes all completed U.S. 
mergers and acquisitions announced between 1997 and 2013 in which (1) the acquirer owned less than 50% of the 
target stock before the announcement, (2) the acquirer owned 100% of the target’s shares after the deal was completed, 
(3) the deal value exceeded U.S. $1 million, and (4) the deal value was more than 1% of the acquirer’s market 
capitalization. Panel A plots the average CAR and NWORDS (unstandardized); panel B plots the relationship between 
SYNERGY and NWORDS (unlogged) for each year. 
 


































































































Table 1. Sample composition by year. 
 
This table shows the distribution of M&A transactions across the sample period. The sample includes all completed 
U.S. mergers and acquisitions announced between 1997 and 2013 in which (1) the acquirer owned less than 50% of 
the target stock before the announcement, (2) the acquirer owned 100% of the target’s shares after the deal was 
completed, (3) the deal value exceeded U.S. $1 million, and (4) the deal value was more than 1% of the acquirer’s 











(in $ millions) 
Median 
Relative Size 
1997 32 0.05 19,165 717 0.31 
1998 43 0.07 21,761 492 0.33 
1999 51 0.08 23,327 435 0.25 
2000 39 0.06 28,552 1,028 0.19 
2001 25 0.04 23,395 191 0.17 
2002 19 0.03 26,600 384 0.16 
2003 32 0.05 26,779 477 0.26 
2004 40 0.07 32,635 753 0.30 
2005 38 0.06 33,664 584 0.24 
2006 51 0.08 33,638 563 0.16 
2007 53 0.09 35,876 810 0.13 
2008 25 0.04 43,587 476 0.15 
2009 30 0.05 41,285 672 0.18 
2010 29 0.05 39,244 734 0.17 
2011 17 0.03 43,880 612 0.22 
2012 38 0.06 47,931 861 0.37 




Table 2. Summary statistics. 
 
This table shows summary statistics for the variables used in our base model. The sample includes all completed U.S. 
mergers and acquisitions announced between 1997 and 2013 in which (1) the acquirer owned less than 50% of the 
target stock before the announcement, (2) the acquirer owned 100% of the target’s shares after the deal was completed, 
(3) the deal value exceeded U.S. $1 million, and (4) the deal value was more than 1% of the acquirer’s market 
capitalization. The sample size consists of 605 deals. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75 
CAR -0.010 0.082 -0.049 -0.008 0.029 
SYNERGY 0.027 0.079 -0.015 0.017 0.062 
NWORDS 0.00 1.00 -0.65 -0.15 0.41 
NWORDS^2 1.00 4.24 0.07 0.31 0.87 
IN_PLAY 0.167 0.373 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ACQ_SIZE 8.052 1.835 6.717 7.977 9.363 
ACQ_TOBIN 1.596 2.327 0.559 1.120 1.823 
ACQ_LEV 0.214 0.185 0.088 0.182 0.294 
ACQ_ROA 0.119 0.116 0.033 0.120 0.184 
TRG_SIZE 6.087 1.590 4.992 5.980 7.206 
TRG_TOBIN 1.362 1.578 0.545 1.017 1.602 
TRG_LEV 0.209 0.214 0.037 0.158 0.323 
TRG_ROA 0.079 0.160 0.024 0.096 0.156 
REL_SIZE 0.448 0.602 0.084 0.223 0.583 
ALL_STOCK 0.309 0.463 0.000 0.000 1.000 
TENDER 0.183 0.387 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HIGH_TECH 0.380 0.486 0.000 0.000 1.000 
DIFFIND 0.312 0.464 0.000 0.000 1.000 
AQ 4.225 2.856 2.000 4.000 7.000 
NASDAQ 0.640 0.480 0.000 1.000 1.000 
SYNC 0.154 0.137 0.043 0.109 0.242 
TRG_BID_ASK 0.012 0.016 0.002 0.005 0.016 





Table 3. Correlation table. 
 
This table shows the Pearson correlation table for the variables used in our base model. The sample includes all completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions announced 
between 1997 and 2013 in which (1) the acquirer owned less than 50% of the target stock before the announcement, (2) the acquirer owned 100% of the target’s 
shares after the deal was completed, (3) the deal value exceeded U.S. $1 million, and (4) the deal value was more than 1% of the acquirer’s market capitalization. 




    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 CAR 1.00            
2 SYNERGY 0.80* 1.00           
3 NWORDS 0.06 0.08* 1.00          
4 NWORDS^2 0.02 0.03 0.63* 1.00         
5 ACQ_SIZE -0.04 -0.21* 0.16* 0.05 1.00        
6 ACQ_TOBIN -0.15* -0.15* -0.10* -0.01 0.14* 1.00       
7 ACQ_LEV 0.12* 0.14* 0.04 0.03 -0.08 -0.10* 1.00      
8 ACQ_ROA 0.12* 0.06 -0.04 0.02 0.32* 0.29* -0.01 1.00     
9 TRG_SIZE -0.11* -0.04 0.28* 0.15* 0.70* 0.05 0.03 0.21* 1.00    
10 TRG_TOBIN -0.12* -0.09* -0.12* -0.03 0.22* 0.66* -0.04 0.24* 0.19* 1.00   
11 TRG_LEV 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.46* 0.05 0.08 -0.02 1.00  
12 TRG_ROA 0.09* 0.11* -0.10* -0.01 0.22* -0.11* 0.13* 0.38* 0.32* 0.04 0.06 1.00 
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Table 4. Univariate analysis. 
 
This table shows the main results of the univariate summary. We group NWORDS into quartiles, and compare CAR 
and SYNERGY between the bottom quartile 1 and top quartile 4 using a parametric t-test and a non-parametric rank-
sum test. The sample includes all completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions announced between 1997 and 2013 in 
which (1) the acquirer owned less than 50% of the target stock before the announcement, (2) the acquirer owned 100% 
of the target’s shares after the deal was completed, (3) the deal value exceeded U.S. $1 million, and (4) the deal value 
was more than 1% of the acquirer’s market capitalization. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. * denotes 
significance at the 5% level.  
 
 Quartile 1 Quartile 4 Difference 
CAR  -0.011 0.002 -0.013* 
T-test statistic    -1.29 
Wilcoxon rank-sum z-stat   -1.43 
SYNERGY  0.027 0.042 -0.015* 
T-test statistic   -1.54 





Table 5. 10-K filing length and M&A returns. 
 
This table shows the results of the regression analysis, where the main independent variable is NWORDS. The 
dependent variables are CAR and SYNERGY. The sample includes all completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions 
announced between 1997 and 2013 in which (1) the acquirer owned less than 50% of the target stock before the 
announcement, (2) the acquirer owned 100% of the target’s shares after the deal was completed, (3) the deal value 
exceeded U.S. $1 million, and (4) the deal value was more than 1% of the acquirer’s market capitalization. All 
regressions include constant, year, and Fama-French twelve-industry dummies. All variables are defined in Appendix 
1. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by 
year and by industry. 
 
  CAR SYNERGY 
  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
NWORDS 0.0070*** (5.95) 0.0061*** (2.94) 
NWORDS^2 -0.0003 (-0.60) -0.0005 (-0.82) 
IN_PLAY 0.0085 (0.94) -0.0058 (-0.68) 
ACQ_SIZE -0.0031 (-0.50) -0.0205*** (-3.86) 
ACQ_TOBIN -0.0003 (-0.03) 0.0011 (0.17) 
ACQ_LEV 0.0725** (2.04) 0.0574** (2.09) 
ACQ_ROA 0.0890 (0.72) 0.0515 (0.51) 
TRG_SIZE -0.0024 (-0.39) 0.0109** (1.99) 
TRG_TOBIN -0.0030 (-0.46) -0.0009 (-0.12) 
TRG_LEV -0.0090 (-0.59) -0.0185 (-0.93) 
TRG_ROA 0.0362 (0.59) 0.0521 (1.39) 
REL_SIZE -0.0185 (-0.92) -0.0126 (-0.94) 
ALL_STOCK -0.0112 (-1.12) -0.0159 (-1.41) 
TENDER 0.0168*** (2.68) 0.0173** (2.46) 
HIGH_TECH -0.0179* (-1.88) -0.0124* (-1.71) 
DIFFIND 0.0007 (0.13) -0.0034 (-0.65) 
AQ -0.0011 (-0.68) -0.0026* (-1.87) 
NASDAQ -0.0079 (-1.49) -0.0060* (-1.68) 
SYNC 0.0140 (0.41) 0.0355 (1.46) 
TRG_BID_ASK -0.1320 (-1.45) -0.0825 (-0.63) 
ANALYST -0.0124*** (-3.11) -0.0036 (-0.77) 
     
YEAR F.E YES YES 
INDUSTRY F.E. YES YES 
     
     
OBS 605 605 





Table 6. Cross-sectional analysis: Private information, 10-K filing length, and M&A returns. 
 
Panel A shows the results for interacting TOP_25_DAYS with NWORDS. TOP_25_DAYS is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the number of days between the signing of the confidentiality agreement and the announcement date is in 
the top quartile, and 0 otherwise. Panel B shows the results for interacting AUCTION with NWORDS. AUCTION is 
an indicator variable that equals 1 if the M&A deal takes the form of an auction, and 0 otherwise. The sample includes 
all completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions announced between 1997 and 2013 in which (1) the acquirer owned less 
than 50% of the target stock before the announcement, (2) the acquirer owned 100% of the target’s shares after the 
deal was completed, (3) the deal value exceeded U.S. $1 million, and (4) the deal value was more than 1% of the 
acquirer’s market capitalization. All regressions include constant, year, and Fama-French twelve-industry dummies. 
All other variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered by year and by industry.  
 
Panel A. Controlling for number of days. 
 CAR SYNERGY 
  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
NWORDS 0.0071* (1.71) 0.0041 (1.10) 
NWORDS*TOP_25_DAYS 0.0057 (0.72) 0.0187** (2.11) 
TOP_25_DAYS 0.0080 (1.38) 0.0042 (0.65) 
NWORDS^2 -0.0001 (-0.21) -0.0000 (-0.02) 
     
CONTROLS YES YES 
YEAR F.E. YES YES 
INDUSTRY F.E. YES YES 
     
OBS 522 522 





Panel B. Controlling for deal type. 
 CAR SYNERGY 
  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
NWORDS 0.0030 (0.98) 0.0012 (0.35) 
NWORDS*AUCTION 0.0150** (2.12) 0.0205** (2.07) 
AUCTION -0.0004 (-0.06) -0.0002 (-0.02) 
NWORDS^2 0.0002 (0.51) 0.0003 (0.41) 
     
CONTROLS YES YES 
YEAR F.E. YES YES 
INDUSTRY F.E. YES YES 
     
OBS 533 533 





Table 7. Cross-sectional analysis: Textual quality, 10-K filing length, and M&A returns. 
 
This table shows the main results of the regression analysis where the main independent variable is NWORDS. The 
dependent variable in panel A is CAR, and it is SYNERGY in panel B. FOG is the 10-K filing Gunning Fog index, 
SMOG is the Smog grading index, and FLESCH is the inverse of the Flesch reading ease index. We calculate these 
variables for the three years prior to the M&A deal. The sample includes all completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions 
announced between 1997 and 2013 in which (1) the acquirer owned less than 50% of the target stock before the 
announcement, (2) the acquirer owned 100% of the target’s shares after the deal was completed, (3) the deal value 
exceeded U.S. $1 million, and (4) the deal value was more than 1% of the acquirer’s market capitalization. All 
regressions include constants, control variables, years, and Fama-French twelve-industry dummies. All other variables 
are defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard 




Panel A. CAR. 
                                                              CAR                                 CAR                             CAR  
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
NWORDS 0.0065*** (5.34) 0.0063*** (5.50) 0.0062*** (4.96) 
NWORDS^2 0.0007 (0.77) 0.0006 (0.69) 0.0011 (1.06) 
FOG 0.0022 (0.70)     
SMOG   0.0021 (0.68)   
FLESCH     0.0022 (1.45) 
NWORDS*FOG -0.0041* (-1.85)     
NWORDS*SMOG   -0.0038 (-1.62)   
NWORDS*FLESCH     -0.0052** (-2.02) 
       
CONTROLS YES YES YES 
YEAR F.E. YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY F.E. YES YES YES 
       
OBS 605 605 605 
R-SQ 0.217 0.216 0.217 
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Panel B. SYNERGY. 
                                                     SYNERGY                   SYNERGY                    SYNERGY  
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
NWORDS 0.0061* (1.87) 0.0061* (1.84) 0.0058** (2.12) 
NWORDS^2 -0.0004 (-0.44) -0.0004 (-0.48) 0.0004 (0.44) 
FOG 0.0001 (0.05)     
SMOG   0.0001 (0.05)   
FLESCH     0.0006 (0.32) 
NWORDS*FOG -0.0004 (-0.27)     
NWORDS*SMOG   -0.0002 (-0.16)   
NWORDS*FLESCH     -0.0033 (-1.62) 
       
CONTROLS YES YES YES 
YEAR F.E. YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY F.E. YES YES YES 
       
OBS 605 605 605 
R-SQ 0.239 0.239 0.239 
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Table 8. Cross-sectional analysis: Accounting quality, 10-K filing length, and M&A returns. 
 
This table shows the results of the regression analysis where the main independent variable is AQ and its interaction 
with NWORDS. AQ is the target’s accrual quality. It is measured by the standard deviation of the firm-level residuals 
from Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model during the years t-5 to t-1, multiplied by -1 and ranked into deciles. The 
dependent variables are CAR and SYNERGY. The sample includes all completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions 
announced between 1997 and 2013 in which (1) the acquirer owned less than 50% of the target stock before the 
announcement, (2) the acquirer owned 100% of the target’s shares after the deal was completed, (3) the deal value 
exceeded U.S. $1 million, and (4) the deal value was more than 1% of the acquirer’s market capitalization. All 
regressions include constant, year, and Fama-French twelve-industry dummies. All variables are defined in Appendix 
1. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by 
year and by industry. 
 
 CAR SYNERGY 
  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
NWORDS 0.0174** (2.58) 0.0135*** (2.86) 
NWORDS*AQ -0.0025** (-2.24) -0.0018 (-1.63) 
AQ -4.6137* (-1.75) -4.1572** (-2.24) 
NWORDS^2 -0.0005 (-0.65) -0.0006 (-0.95) 
     
CONTROLS YES YES 
YEAR F.E. YES YES 
INDUSTRY F.E. YES YES 
     
OBS 605 605 




Table 9. Cross-sectional analysis: 10-K filing tone, 10-K filing length, and M&A returns. 
 
This table shows the results of the regression analysis where the main independent variable is TOP_25_TONE, an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if TONE is in the top quartile, and 0 otherwise. TONE is defined as the sum of the 
relative amount of words denoting uncertainty and modal weakness, as defined in the Loughran and McDonald (2014) 
word dictionaries. The dependent variables are CAR and SYNERGY. The sample includes all completed U.S. mergers 
and acquisitions announced between 1997 and 2013 in which (1) the acquirer owned less than 50% of the target stock 
before the announcement, (2) the acquirer owned 100% of the target’s shares after the deal was completed, (3) the 
deal value exceeded U.S. $1 million, and (4) the deal value was more than 1% of the acquirer’s market capitalization. 
All regressions include constant, year, and Fama-French twelve-industry dummies. All variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered by year and by industry. 
 
 CAR SYNERGY 
  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
NWORDS 0.0051*** (3.11) 0.0043* (1.97) 
NWORDS*TOP_25_TONE 0.0115** (2.15) 0.0104*** (2.77) 
TOP_25_TONE -0.0283*** (-3.19) -0.0234** (-2.42) 
NWORDS^2 -0.0004 (-0.65) -0.0005 (-0.84) 
     
CONTROLS YES YES 
YEAR F.E. YES YES 
INDUSTRY F.E. YES YES 
     
OBS 605 605 




Table 10. Abnormal number of words and M&A returns. 
This table shows the results of the regression analysis where the main independent variable is ABNWORDS. The 
dependent variables are CAR and SYNERGY. The sample includes all completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions 
announced between 1997 and 2013 in which (1) the acquirer owned less than 50% of the target stock before the 
announcement, (2) the acquirer owned 100% of the target’s shares after the deal was completed, (3) the deal value 
exceeded U.S. $1 million, and (4) the deal value was more than 1% of the acquirer’s market capitalization. All 
regressions include constant, year, and Fama-French twelve-industry dummies. All variables are defined in Appendix 
1. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by 
year and by industry. 
 
  
 CAR SYNERGY 
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
ABNWORDS 0.0089*** (6.74) 0.0054*** (4.07) 
IN_PLAY 0.0070 (0.77) -0.0073 (-0.86) 
ACQ_SIZE -0.0036 (-0.61) -0.0209*** (-4.05) 
ACQ_TOBIN -0.0000 (-0.00) 0.0016 (0.27) 
ACQ_LEV 0.0749** (2.14) 0.0622** (2.18) 
ACQ_ROA 0.0964 (0.78) 0.0622 (0.60) 
TRG_SIZE -0.0022 (-0.40) 0.0101* (1.94) 
TRG_TOBIN -0.0034 (-0.55) -0.0007 (-0.10) 
TRG_LEV -0.0109 (-1.05) -0.0189 (-1.12) 
TRG_ROA 0.0342 (0.57) 0.0517 (1.46) 
REL_SIZE -0.0184 (-0.95) -0.0122 (-0.91) 
ALL_STOCK -0.0122 (-1.47) -0.0179 (-1.64) 
TENDER 0.0156** (2.42) 0.0168** (2.48) 
HIGH_TECH -0.0219** (-2.14) -0.0145 (-1.56) 
DIFFIND 0.0009 (0.20) -0.0026 (-0.50) 
AQ -0.0009 (-0.65) -0.0026** (-2.02) 
NASDAQ -0.0081* (-1.71) -0.0074*** (-5.67) 
SYNC 0.0381 (1.57) 0.0577*** (2.83) 
TRG_BID_ASK -0.2019 (-1.24) -0.1553 (-1.05) 
ANALYST -0.0121** (-2.38) -0.0024 (-0.42) 
     
YEAR F.E. YES YES 
INDUSTRY F.E. YES YES 
     
OBS 605 605 




Table 11. Number of words and M&A returns: Subsample analysis. 
This table shows the results of the regression analysis where the main independent variable is NWORDS. The 
dependent variables are CAR and SYNERGY. The sample includes all completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions 
announced between 1997 and 2013 in which (1) the acquirer owned less than 50% of the target stock before the 
announcement, (2) the acquirer owned 100% of the target’s shares after the deal was completed, (3) the deal value 
exceeded U.S. $1 million, and (4) the deal value was more than 1% of the acquirer’s market capitalization. We exclude 
transactions where the target was subject to shareholder activism or to previous acquisitions. All regressions include 
constant, year, and Fama-French twelve-industry dummies. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by year and by industry. 
 
 CAR SYNERGY 
  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
NWORDS 0.0097*** (4.15) 0.0094*** (3.87) 
NWORDS^2 -0.0004 (-0.47) -0.0006 (-0.85) 
     
CONTROLS YES YES 
YEAR F.E. YES YES 
INDUSTRY F.E. YES YES 
     
OBS 411 411 




Table 12. Number of words and M&A returns: Controlling for auditors, management disclosure, risk, and complexity. 
Panel A shows the results when the dependent variable is CAR, and panel B shows the results for SYNERGY. The sample includes all completed U.S. mergers and 
acquisitions announced between 1997 and 2013 in which (1) the acquirer owned less than 50% of the target stock before the announcement, (2) the acquirer owned 
100% of the target’s shares after the deal was completed, (3) the deal value exceeded U.S. $1 million, and (4) the deal value was more than 1% of the acquirer’s 
market capitalization. All regressions include constant, year, and Fama-French twelve-industry dummies. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by year and by industry.  
 
Panel A. CAR 
  CAR CAR CAR CAR 
  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
NWORDS 0.0064*** (4.78) 0.0069*** (3.91) 0.0069*** (4.34) 0.0062*** (7.11) 
NWORDS^2 -0.0003 (-0.59) -0.0003 (-0.42) -0.0001 (-0.25) -0.0000 (-0.06) 
COMMON_AU 0.0031 (0.78)     0.0060 (1.48) 
K8_COUNT 0.0002 (0.77)     0.0001 (0.42) 
TRG_VOL   0.4590 (1.05)   0.4273 (1.14) 
TRG_FRG   -0.0428** (-2.20)   -0.0422*** (-2.78) 
STD_CFO   0.0134 (0.77)   0.0133 (0.74) 
SPEC_ITEMS_D     0.0112* (1.76) 0.0106 (1.58) 
LBUSSEG     0.0022 (1.01) 0.0020 (0.97) 
LGEOSEG     -0.0028*** (-6.55) -0.0030*** (-6.57) 
LTOTNONMISS     0.0000 (0.12) -0.0000 (-0.10) 
         
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES 
YEAR F.E. YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY F.E. YES YES YES YES 
         
OBS 605 605 605  605  




Panel B. SYNERGY. 
  SYNERGY SYNERGY SYNERGY SYNERGY 
  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
NWORDS 0.0057*** (2.84) 0.0054*** (3.05) 0.0060** (2.48) 0.0049*** (2.81) 
NWORDS^2 -0.0005 (-0.84) -0.0004 (-0.60) -0.0002 (-0.35) -0.0001 (-0.16) 
COMMON_AU 0.0045 (0.80)     0.0077 (1.34) 
K8_COUNT 0.0001 (0.47)     0.0001 (0.36) 
TRG_VOL   0.4308 (0.95)   0.4899 (1.32) 
TRG_FRG   -0.0258 (-1.58)   -0.0248 (-1.52) 
STD_CFO   -0.0766 (-1.51)   -0.0669 (-1.35) 
SPEC_ITEMS_D     0.0048 (1.10) 0.0036 (0.82) 
LBUSSEG     0.0019 (1.10) 0.0017 (1.02) 
LGEOSEG     -0.0033*** (-4.76) -0.0034*** (-3.91) 
LTOTNONMISS     -0.0001 (-0.86) -0.0001 (-0.98) 
         
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES 
YEAR F.E. YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY F.E. YES YES YES YES 
         
OBS 605 605 605  605  
R-SQ 0.240 0.245 0.260  0.268  
 
